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FINANCIAL MARKET REGULATION 
AND SUPERVISION: HOW MANY PEAKS 
FOR THE EURO AREA? 
Giorgio Di Giorgio*  
Carmine Di Noia** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
inancial markets have developed significantly throughout 
industrialized countries in the last decades of the twenti-
eth century.  This path is evident with regard to banking 
and financial intermediaries, capital markets, and financial 
instruments.  Accordingly, many European nations have either 
modified their financial systems — regulatory and supervisory 
— to reflect this development1 or are currently debating 
whether to implement such modifications.2  In Europe, with the 
start of Phase III of the European Economic and Monetary Un-
ion (“EMU”), the responsibility for monetary policy in the euro 
area has been assigned to the European Central Bank (“ECB”),3 
while banking and financial supervisory tasks have been left to 
domestic agencies.4  This development, which reflects “[t]he 
abandonment of the coincidence between the area of jurisdiction 
of monetary policy and the area of jurisdiction of banking su-
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 1. As is the case most recently with Germany, Austria, Ireland, Portugal 
and the Netherlands, and earlier in the Scandinavian countries and the 
United Kingdom.   
 2. As in the case of Italy and France.   
 3. Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, EMU and Banking Supervision, 2 INT ’L FIN. 
295, 297 (1999).   
 4. Id. at 269. 
F 
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pervision,” was a relative novelty in the euro area.5  This geo-
graphical and functional “double separation” between central 
banking and banking supervision6, along with the absence of 
any explicit reference to responsibility for financial stability in 
the euro area, has cast doubts about the efficacy of the current 
regulatory arrangements in preventing and managing financial 
crises.7  As a consequence, both academic and institutional ven-
ues throughout the euro area are now discussing various pro-
posals for financial system regulatory reforms.8   
Naturally, the first decision lies between choosing either cen-
tralized or decentralized financial regulation.  National level 
regulation and supervision are faced with great difficulties 
within the context of increasing financial markets integration 
and cross-border mergers among banks, securities firms, and 
insurance companies.  However, the task of fully centralizing 
regulatory and supervisory activities at the euro level has 
proven equally challenging, given the current differences in fis-
cal and commercial codes, and accounting practices across 
member countries.   
This work presents a proposal for the reorganization of regu-
latory arrangements and supervisory agencies in the EMU.  It 
  
 5. Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, EMU and Banking Supervision, Lecture at 
the London School of Economics Financial Markets Group (Feb. 24, 1999), 
available at http://www.ecb.int/key/sp990224.htm.   
 6. Padoa-Schioppa, supra note 3, at 297. 
 7. Id. at 305.   
 8. See KAREL LANNOO, CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN POLICY STUDIES (“CEPS”), 
TASK FORCE REPORT NO. 30: CHALLENGES TO THE STRUCTURAL SUPERVISION IN 
THE EU 34 (2000); Xavier Vives, Banking Supervision in the European Mone-
tary Union (1999), at http://www.iue.it/FinConEU/vives.pdf; EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION, INTERNAL MARKET DIRECTORATE GENERAL, INSTITUTIONAL 
ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE REGULATION AND SUPERVISION OF THE FINANCIAL 
SECTOR (2000), at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/finances/ 
banks/arrange.pdf [hereinafter INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS]; THE 
COMMITTEE OF WISE MEN, FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF WISE MEN ON 
THE REGULATION OF EUROPEAN SECURITIES MARKETS (2001), available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/finances/general/lamfalussyen.
pdf. [hereinafter LAMFALUSSY REPORT]; DIRECTORATE FOR FINANCIAL , FISCAL, 
AND ENTERPRISE AFFAIRS , ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND 
DEVELOPMENT (“OECD”), CONSOLIDATED SUPERVISION IN THEORY AND IN 
PRACTICE 8, Doc. No. DAFFE/CMF (2001) [hereinafter OECD 2001]; Stephen 
A. Lumpkin, Supervision of Financial Services in the OECD Area, 81 FIN. 
MARKET TRENDS 81, 81–139 (Apr. 2002), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/pdf/M00032000/M00032071.pdf [hereinafter OECD 2002].   
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argues that with a highly integrated single currency, such as 
exists in the euro financial system, maintaining only domesti-
cally-based regulatory schemes and supervisory practices is in-
appropriate.  At the same time, as stressed in the Lamfalussy 
Report, full centralization appears difficult to achieve in the 
near future.9  Hence, this Article suggests a two-level architec-
ture for financial market regulation and supervision inspired by 
the European System of Central Banks (“ESCB”).10 
This innovative proposal’s theoretical underpinnings for euro 
area financial market regulation reform, may be found within 
the new literature on the theory of financial intermediation.11  
This literature emphasizes the similarities rather than the dif-
ferences among banking and other financial intermediaries.12  
The main similarities include the provision of risk management 
services to customers, and decreasing the participation costs in 
ever more complex financial markets.13  Indeed, the traditional 
lines that divide financial institutions, instruments, and mar-
kets into banking, insurance, and securities sectors have be-
come blurred in advanced industrial countries.14  Technological, 
geographical, and functional integration has led to de-
specialization of the intermediaries and the reduction of the 
“reserved activities” that previously characterized different 
types of financial operators.15  The traditional tripartite division 
of the financial market (i.e., the banking, insurance, and securi-
  
 9. LAMFALUSSY REPORT, supra note 8, at 10.   
 10. The European System of Central Banks (“ESCB”) is composed of the 
European Central Bank (“ECB”) and the national central banks (“NCBs”) of 
all fifteen EU member states.  The “euro system” is the term used to refer to 
the ECB and the NCBs that have adopted the euro as currency.  The primary 
objective of the euro system is to maintain price stability.  See Organization of 
the European System of Central Banks, at http://www.ecb.int/ 
about/escb.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2003). 
 11. See Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, Financial Markets, Intermediaries, 
and Intertemporal Smoothing, 105 J. POL. ECON . 523 (1997); Franklin Allen & 
Anthony M. Santomero, Theory of Financial Intermediation, 21 J. BANKING &  
FIN. 1461 (1997).   
 12. George S. Oldfield & Anthony M. Santomero, Risk Management in 
Financial Institutions, SLOAN MGMT. REV. 33, 36 (1997); Allen & Santomero, 
supra note 11, at 1462.   
 13. Allen & Santomero, supra note 11, at 1462. 
 14. See infra Part II. 
 15. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT , 
FINANCIAL MARKET TRENDS NO. 81, SUPERVISION OF FINANCIAL SERVICES IN THE 
OECD AREA 82 (2002) [hereinafter OECD FINANCIAL SERVICES].   
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ties sectors) failed to consider that the creation and allocation of 
savings among sectors cash surpluses and cash deficits, were 
basically unitary phenomena.   
The current stream of literature advocates a unitary view of 
financial intermediation that requires homogeneous regula-
tion.16  Contrary to the unitary view, the old “institutional” 
model for financial market regulation and supervision should be 
dismissed.  In such a traditional regulatory model, supervision 
is over each single category of financial operator, or over each 
single segment of the financial market, and all supervisory ac-
tivities are assigned to a distinct agency.17  In this institutional 
model, there are three supervisory authorities acting as watch-
dogs over: (1) banks; (2) financial intermediaries and mutual 
funds; and (3) insurance companies and their corresponding 
markets, respectfully.  The authorities control intermediaries 
and markets through entry selection processes (e.g., authoriza-
tions and enrolling procedures in special registers), constant 
monitoring of business activities (controls, inspections, and 
sanctions) and decisions about exit from the market (suspen-
sions or removal).  “Institutional” regulation facilitates the ef-
fective realization of controls.  Each intermediary and market 
has to deal with only one, highly specialized supervisory author-
ity.  As a result, this type of regulation avoids duplication of 
controls and reduces regulation costs.  The institutional ap-
proach seems to be particularly effective for intermediaries spe-
cialized in only one of the three segments of the financial sector.  
However, when different entities are entitled to perform identi-
cal financial intermediation activities, the institutional model 
may induce distortions in the market. For example, financial 
supervisors impose different rules upon entities that conduct 
similar financial services whose only difference is their legal 
status.18   
The institutional approach’s disadvantages are exacerbated 
by the trend toward multiple-sector activities and by the pro-
gressive de-specialization of intermediaries.19  In turn, these 
phenomena are connected to the growing integration of finan-
  
 16. OECD FINANCIAL SERVICES, supra note 15, at 98.   
 17. CHARLES GOODHART ET AL ., FINANCIAL REGULATION : WHY, HOW, AND 
WHERE NOW? 144 (1998).   
 18. Id. at 146–47. 
 19. See id. at 143. 
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cial markets and instruments.20  In a context where the 
boundaries separating the various institutions are progressively 
being erased, it is no longer possible to definitively determine 
whether particular entities are banks, non-banking intermedi-
aries, or insurance companies.  Nor is it easy to determine to 
what degree and extent such entities are engaged in the various 
financial activities.  Therefore, a risk exists that “parallel” sys-
tems of intermediaries may form, reflecting only the diversity of 
the respective control authorities.  In this case, the way that 
institutional controls are established may actually become a 
destabilizing factor.  Moreover, the financial intermediaries 
might be induced to organize in such a way that their juridical 
status is contingent upon the different rules that discipline dif-
ferent institutions.   
For all these reasons, the recent trend is in favor of a “level 
playing field” financial regulation model, providing uniform 
rules for entities that engage in similar activities.  Different 
models of such “transversal” regulation have been adopted re-
cently or are currently under discussion in Europe and else-
where.  The best known solution is the Single Regulator Model, 
adopted in the United Kingdom (“U.K.”) in 1997, as well as in 
some Nordic European countries (e.g., Sweden and Denmark), 
and more recently in Austria and Germany.21   
This Article argues for a more general policy proposal based 
on the “transversal” model — recently adopted in Australia — 
which serves to shift the attention away from supervised insti-
tutions to the actual “object” of the supervision.22  It is centered 
  
 20. See Richard Dale, Regulating the New Financial Markets, in RESERVE 
BANK OF AUSTRALIA, THE FUTURE OF THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM: PROCEEDINGS OF A 
CONFERENCE (Malcolm Edey ed., 1996), available at  
http://www.rba.gov.au/PublicationsAndResearch/Conferences/ 
1996/Dale.pdf. 
 21. Michael Taylor & Alex Flemming, Integrated Financial Supervision: 
Lessons of Scandinavian Experience, FI N. &  DEV. 42, 42 (1999), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/1999/12taylor.htm.  See also OECD 
2001, supra note 8, at 2, 10, 24 n.1.   
 22. GOODHART ET AL., supra note 17, at 149.  See generally AUSTL. SEC. &  
INV . COMM’N, ANN. REP. 1999–2000 [hereinafter ASIC  ANN. REP.]; OECD 2001, 
supra note 8.  In Australia, the Australia Prudential Regulation Authority 
(“APRA”) has identified the coordination of prudential supervision of financial 
conglomerates as one of its major roles.  COUNCIL OF FINANCIAL REGULATORS 
ANN. REP. 2001, available at http://www.apra.gov.au/ 
Policy/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&PageID=4835. 
File: DI GIORGIO Base  Macro.doc Created on:  3/19/2003 3:33 PM Last Printed: 4/28/2003 11:29 AM 
468 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 28:2 
on the assignment of different regulatory objectives, or “finali-
ties,” to different and independent authorities.23  These authori-
ties would be competent throughout the financial system, pro-
viding homogeneous regulation and supervision regardless of 
the intermediaries’ subjective nature.  In the euro area, given 
the previously mentioned difficulties in choosing a solution be-
tween full centralization or decentralization, this Article sug-
gests merging these regulatory models “by objective” into a fed-
eral system organized similar to the ESCB.  However, it is also 
argued that the Single Regulator Model may be viewed as a 
particular case of the regulatory model “by objective,” and that 
the choice between specification or a more complex version de-
pends upon some practical considerations in terms of cost-
benefit analysis.   
In practice, the proposal advocated in this Article is the es-
tablishment of a “European System of Financial Regulators,” 
with either two or three distinct independent authorities along 
with the ECB at the European level, each being responsible for 
one or more regulatory objectives.  Such a system should char-
acterize these agencies by homogeneous procedures governing 
their creation, functioning, and funding.  In turn, these agencies 
will push and coordinate the work of their corresponding na-
tional authorities within each member country.  Under such a 
regulatory system, at both the European and domestic level, a 
coordination committee would serve to resolve conflicts and con-
troversies.  For this reason, considerable effort would be needed 
to ensure proper accountability of such independent authorities.   
Part II begins with a description of the currently adopted 
regulatory frameworks for financial markets and intermediar-
ies in the European countries.  Part III presents a proposal for a 
new European architecture for financial market regulation, 
evaluating the pros and cons of two possible practical and al-
  
 23. The Council of Financial Regulator’s role is to contribute to the effi-
ciency and effectiveness of financial regulation by providing a high level forum 
for cooperation and collaboration among its members including the Reserve 
Bank of Australia (“RBA”), which chairs the Council, APRA, and the Austra-
lian Securities and Investments Commission (“ASIC”).  See APRA, at 
http://www.apra.gov.au/Policy/ 
The-Council-of-Financial-Regulators.cfm (last visited Mar. 8, 2003).  See also 
Government Online Stategy: The Australian Prudental Regulation Authority’s 
Online Action Plan § 2.4, at http://www.apra.gov.au/aboutAPRA/ (last visited 
Mar. 8, 2003) [hereinafter APRA Online Action Plan].   
File: DI GIORGIO Base  Macro.doc Created on: 3/19/2003 3:33 PM Last Printed: 4/28/2003 11:29 AM 
2003] FINANCIAL REGULATION IN EURO AREA 469 
ternative solutions.  Finally, Part IV presents an overview of 
the issues at hand and provides policy prescriptions for the euro 
area.   
II. FINANCIAL REGULATION AND SUPERVISION IN EUROPE: 
WHERE DO WE STAND? 
Economic regulation aims at correcting market imperfections 
and unfair distribution of resources, while simultaneously pur-
suing three general objectives: stability, equitable resource dis-
tribution, and efficiency.  Regulating and supervising the finan-
cial system is particularly important, especially since capital 
accumulation and the allocation of financial resources are es-
sential for growth and development.24   
The first objective of financial market regulation is the pur-
suit of macroeconomic stability.25  Central banks fulfill this ob-
jective through macro-controls over currencies (when applica-
ble), interest rates, payment, and (possibly) settlement systems.  
They also function as lenders of last resort.   
The second objective pertains to micro-stability (i.e., pruden-
tial regulation) of the intermediaries.26  Measures targeting this 
goal are subdivided into two categories: general rules on the 
stability of all business enterprises and entrepreneurial activi-
ties,27 and more specific rules due to the special nature of finan-
cial intermediation.28 
The third objective of financial regulation is transparency of 
the market and of intermediaries, i.e., investor protection.29  
  
 24. See generally GOODHART ET AL ., supra note 17; DAVID LLEWELLYN, THE 
ECONOMIC RATIONALE FOR FINANCIAL REGULATION, FINANCIAL SERVICES 
AUTHORITY (1999), RICHARD J. HERRING & ANTHONY M. SANTOMERO, WHAT IS 
OPTIMAL FINANCIAL REGULATION? (Wharton Fin. Inst. Ctr., Working Paper No. 
00-34, 1999).   
 25. GOODHART ET AL., supra note 17, at 189. 
 26. Id. at 5–6, 189.  See also HERRING & SANTOMERO, supra note 24, at 4.   
 27. Such as the legally required amount of capital, borrowing limits and 
integrity requirements.   
 28. Such as risk-based capital ratios, limits to portfolio investments and 
the regulation of off-balance activities, the managing of deposit insurance 
funds or investor compensation schemes.  See generally HERRING &  
SANTOMERO, supra note 24, at 17–19. 
 29. See OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES OF SECURITIES REGULATION, 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 4.2.2, at 8 (1998) 
(“Transparency may be defined as the degree to which information about trad-
ing (both for pre-trade and post-trade information) is made publicly available 
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This is linked to the more general objective of equitable distri-
bution of available resources and may be viewed as the search 
for “equity in the distribution of information as a precious good” 
among market participants.30  At the macro-level, transparency 
rules impose equal treatment (e.g., rules regarding takeovers 
and public offers)31 and the correct dissemination of information 
(e.g., rules prohibiting insider trading and manipulation and, 
more generally, the rules dealing with exchange microstruc-
tures and price-discovery mechanisms).32  At the micro-level, 
such rules aim at guaranteeing non-discrimination in the rela-
tionships among intermediaries and different customers by es-
tablishing conduct of business rules.33 
The fourth objective of financial market regulation, linked 
with the general objective of efficiency, is the safeguarding and 
promotion of competition in the financial sector.34  This type of 
regulation requires rules for controlling market power and 
structures, which at the micro level involves mergers and ac-
quisitions regulations, as well as safeguards against cartels and 
abuses of dominant position.  Specific controls over financial 
intermediaries and markets may be also justified as an attempt 
to limit destabilizing excesses generated by tough competition 
in this important sector. 
In order to pursue these enumerated objectives, there is nei-
ther a unique theoretical model nor a practical approach to the 
regulation and supervision of financial markets.  Literature on 
these matters identifies significant differences in both the defi-
nitions and classifications of regulatory models and tech-
niques.35  In reality, it is also difficult to observe the adoption of 
regulatory schemes that are fully consistent with only one theo-
  
on a real-time basis.”).  See also, e.g., CLIVE BRIAULT, THE RATIONALE FOR A 
SINGLE NATIONAL FINANCIAL SERVICES REGULATOR, FINANCIAL SERVICES 
AUTHORITY 10 (1999).  See also, HERRING & SANTOMERO, supra note 24, at 9. 
 30. See HERRING & SANTOMERO, supra note 24, at 6–8.  See generally Allen 
& Gale, supra note 11.   
 31. See HERRING & SANTOMERO, supra note 24, at 7–8. 
 32. See BRIAULT, supra note 29, at 10.  See also HERRING & SANTOMERO , 
supra note 24, at 9–10. 
 33. See HERRING & SANTOMERO, supra note 24, at 7–8. 
 34. See, Lawrence J. White, International Regulation of Securities Markets: 
Competition or Harmonization?, in THE INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION AND 
REGULATION OF THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY 208, 219–21 (Andrew W. Lo ed., 
1996) [hereinafter White, International Regulation of Securities Markets]. 
 35. See generally OECD 2002, supra note 8. 
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retical model.  A glance at the European Union’s current state 
of financial market regulatory and supervisory arrangements 
confirms this, making it evident that multiple regulatory 
schemes often are in effect.36   
In each European country, financial markets regulation has 
been affected by the structure and the evolution of the domestic 
financial system as well as by the legal system in place.37  In 
general, national regulation first focused on banking intermedi-
aries, given their traditional dominant role in continental 
Europe’s financial sector.38  Most of the recent changes in mem-
ber countries came about as a result of pressure brought on by 
EC directives and from increased cross-border financial market 
integration, which at first stimulated and then followed the 
1992 single market program.39  However, despite EU member 
countries’ implicit commitment to ensuring the adequate regu-
lation and supervision of financial sectors, no European law 
deals with the problem of how to regulate and supervise finan-
cial markets and intermediaries.40  As a consequence, the EU 
currently utilizes a combination of different regulatory ap-
proaches.  Moreover, many member countries also lack a “pure” 
regulatory model that applies throughout the national financial 
system.   
The Nordic European countries (in particular, Sweden and 
Denmark), the U.K., Austria, and Germany, have chosen to 
delegate financial regulation and supervision to a unified 
  
 36. See infra Figure 1.  See generally id. 
 37. See generally OECD 2002, supra note 8. 
 38. See, e.g., id. at 85. 
 39. Moreover, in many member countries no “pure” regulatory model is 
adopted throughout the national financial system.  Id. at 109–19.   
 40. Id. at 116.  Sweden’s “single integrated agency” is known as Finansin-
spektionen, which was structurally changed into one agency in September 
2000.  Id. at 116.  In Denmark, financial services are supervised by the Finan-
stilysynet, which was created in January 1988.  Id. at 117.  In the U.K., finan-
cial services are supervised by the Financial Services Authority, which was 
created in late 2001, and is subject to the Financial Services and Markets Act 
of 2000.  Id.  Germany consolidated its various supervisory agencies into the 
Federal Agency for Financial Market Supervision, or the Bundesanstalt für 
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht.  Id. at 109. In April 2002, Austria also adopted 
a single regulatory model.  Id. at 113–14.  See Carmine Di Noia & Giorgio Di 
Giorgio, Should Banking Supervision and Monetary Policy Tasks be Given to 
Different Agencies?, 3 INT’L FIN. 361, 366 (1999). 
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agency, separated by the central bank.41  This regulatory ap-
proach is a coherent and integral application of the Single 
Regulator Model, based on just one control authority with re-
sponsibility over all markets and intermediaries, regardless of 
whether in the banking, financial or insurance sector.42  Such 
regulatory authority concerns itself with all the objectives of 
regulation, but in particular with microeconomic stability and 
investor protection.43  Recently, Ireland commenced and France 
announced projects aimed at establishing a new single regula-
tory agency for financial services in order to consolidate pruden-
tial supervision and investor protection across the financial sec-
tor.44   
In most other EU countries, the traditional “institutional” 
model seems to still be in effect for the insurance sector, in spite 
of the increasing role of insurance companies as important fi-
nancial intermediaries.  In Belgium, Luxembourg, and Finland, 
a separate agency is responsible for supervision of banking ac-
tivities, securities markets, and investment funds and firms, 
but none exist for insurance.  As a matter of fact, contracts in-
volving life insurance and capitalization provide services that 
are directly tied to investment funds, stock exchange, or other 
financial indices (i.e., unit-linked or index-linked contracts).  All 
major financial systems should accept the financial regulation 
of life insurance, since the distinctiveness of most schemes of 
life insurance, compared to other financial products, has less-
ened considerably.45 
  
 41. See OECD 2002, supra note 8, at 109, 116–17. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 118.  Ireland’s supervisory agency will be known as the Irish 
Financial Services Regulatory Authority.  Id. 
 44. Id. at 112–15. 
 45. In the U.K. system, for instance, long-term life insurance contracts are 
included under investments (financial instruments) as provided by the Finan-
cial Services Act 1986 (“FSA”).  The recent establishment of the FSA will fur-
ther reduce the distinctiveness of insurance companies by applying a common 
regulation to all financial institutions.  Under the U.S. system, variable an-
nuities and variable life insurance contracts whose yield is tied to “separate 
accounts,” fall under the Investment Company Act of 1940, ch. 686, tit. I, 54 
Stat. 789 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-52 (2000)), which 
provides the general guidelines relative to investment activities.  In the euro 
area, on the contrary, insurance companies are generally excluded from the 
set of rules that apply to banks and to other financial intermediaries.  In most 
countries, life insurance policies are not considered financial instruments and 
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A specialized “institutional” supervisor is also widely in place 
for the securities market.  However, in countries such as Italy 
and Portugal, security supervisors are only responsible for in-
vestor protection, since the central bank assumes the role of 
safeguarding stability objectives.  In this case, the regulatory 
model by objective applies in part.  Another partial application 
of this model is found in recent Dutch reform.46  The Nether-
lands established a single authority for financial market trans-
parency and investor protection, while leaving the supervisory 
responsibility for microeconomic stability, to either the central 
bank, for banking and securities, or to a separate agency dedi-
cated to insurance and pension funds.   
In many EU countries, banking supervision is one of the 
functions of the national central bank.  However, in some coun-
tries, such as Belgium, Luxembourg, Finland, and to an extent 
France, this task is assigned to a separate agency, or is per-
formed jointly by the National Bank and another agency.47  In 
fact, there is a long debate among monetary economists on 
whether banking supervision and monetary policy responsibili-
ties should be vested in the same institution, namely — the cen-
tral bank.48  Although no consensus among the scholars has 
been reached, there is a general preference towards separating 
the two functions.49  The euro area currently overcomes this 
  
insurance companies are not authorised to perform investment services.  Al-
though there is an increasing tendency to recognise the high degree of conti-
guity between certain insurance products and other financial products, the 
regulatory differences remain significant and insurance companies are super-
vised and controlled by a specialized supervisory authority with the exception 
of Austria and Ireland, where responsibility is given to a government depart-
ment.  In Austria, the government is directly responsible for regulating and 
supervising the entire financial system, although a recent proposal aims at 
introducing a separate and dedicated independent agency along the lines of 
the FSA.   
 46. See OECD 2002, supra note 8, at 109–19.   
 47. VIVES, supra note 8.  See also, e.g., OECD 2002, supra note 8, at 109–19 
(reporting on the banking supervisions of EU members including Belgium, 
Luxembourg, Finland, and France).   
 48. See also RICHARD K. ABRAMS & MICHAEL TAYLOR, ISSUES IN THE 
UNIFICATION OF FINANCIAL SECTOR SUPERVISION 19–21 (IMF, Working Paper, 
2000); Charles Goodhart & Dirk Schoenmaker, Institutional Separation Be-
tween Supervisory and Monetary Agencies, 51 GIORNALE DEGLI ECONOMISTI E 
ANNALI DI ECONOMIA 339–58 (1993). 
 49. Goodhart & Schoenmaker, supra note 48, at 337; Di Noia & Di Giorgio, 
supra note 40, at 362–63.   
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problem, however, because the national central banks, even 
when acting as financial supervisors, are no longer technically 
in charge of monetary policy.50  Figure 1 summarizes the cur-
rent structure of financial supervision in the EU.   
Regionally, the process of financial integration followed quite 
heterogeneous paths.  With regard to the intermediaries, own-
ership integration has developed through an increasing number 
of mergers and acquisitions and the establishment of new alli-
ances d irected to diversify the business, either geographically or 
functionally.  Even though the process is still characterized by a 
dominant share of domestic deals, cross-border operations have 
recently become more important and are likely to develop fur-
ther in the near future.51  Currently, traditional banking’s 
prominent role in continental Europe is being challenged by 
advances in information and delivery technology, and by the 
entry of new and aggressive financial industry players.52  While 
information and delivery technology advances have the effect of 
lowering barriers to entry in banking and finance, the appear-
ance of aggressive new financial players contributes to the ero-
sion of the traditional banks’ monopoly, and comparative ad-
vantages in information gathering, monitoring, delivery capac-
ity and processing.53  In fact, European financial market liber-
alization also started a deep process of business restructuring 
across the entire financial sector.  The search for economies of 
scale led to a reduced number of banks, insurance, and financial 
firms which in turn lead to a considerable increase in market 
concentration.  For these reasons, financial conglomerates 
gradually become more important, tending to act more and 
more on an international basis — both at a European and 
global level.   
Considerable integration has taken place between the bank-
ing, insurance, and securities markets.54  In most EU countries, 
banks and insurance companies are among the most important 
issuers of stocks and other securities traded in both organized 
  
 50. See Padoa-Schioppa, supra note 3, at 297.   
 51. Alberto Cybo-Ottone et al., Recent Development in the Structure of 
Securities Markets, in BROOKINGS-WHARTON PAPERS ON FINANCIAL SERVICES  
223, 234, 238 (R. Litan & A. Santomero eds., 2000).   
 52. Padoa-Schioppa, supra note 3, at 299.   
 53. Id.  See also LANNOO, supra note 8, at 5. 
 54. Goodhart & Schoenmaker, supra note 48, at 336.   
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exchanges and over-the-counter.  Financial products and in-
struments have also experienced a certain degree of integration, 
sometimes changing their original economic function.55  In gen-
eral, financial products have become increasingly complex, call-
ing for new and enhanced skills in regulatory and supervisory 
activities.  Furthermore, the EMU increased the level of substi-
tutability between national government and corporate bonds 
because differences in interest rates across member countries 
vanished.  The euro is also impacting the demand side of the 
stock exchanges’ business by making them quasi-perfect substi-
tutes.  For example, even though the most important exchange 
in Europe, the London Stock Exchange, belongs to a non-euro 
country, a sufficient number of regulatory and fiscal differences 
between EMU countries still exist.56   
The adoption of the single currency will speed up a naturally 
ongoing process of market integration towards financial con-
glomeration in Europe.57  Supervising organizations are not nec-
essarily a minor challenge for regulators.  If it is true that risk 
diversification might be within reach, the possibility of 
excessive risk concentration also exists, especially when a 
domestic-based regulator looses control over the many 
internationally linked activities of the supervised entities.58  
Risks at group level do not always coincide with the sum of 
individual risks.  Moreover, larger balances may allow for more 
creative accounting.   
There is no point in having a common monetary policy and 
aiming at an integrated financial system in the euro area while 
keeping different financial regulations and supervising rules in 
each member country.  As a matter of fact, these national insti-
  
 55. ALESSANDRO PRATI & GARRY J. SCHINASI, FINANCIAL STABILITY IN 
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION 59–66 (Princeton Studies in Int’l 
Fin., No. 86, 1999).  Cf. LAWRENCE J. WHITE, TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE , 
FINANCIAL INNOVATION, AND FINANCIAL REGULATION: THE CHALLENGES FOR 
PUBLIC POLICY 31–33 (Wharton Fin. Inst. Ctr., Working Paper No. 97-33, 
1997), at http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/papers/p9733.htm [hereinafter 
WHITE, TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE] (noting the change of financial products and 
instruments in the U.S.). 
 56. See generally Roberta Karmel, The Case for a European Securities 
Commission, 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT ’L L. 9, 33, 42 (1999).   
 57. See generally V IVES, supra note 8, at 6–8, 20. 
 58. Franco Bruni & Christian de Boissieu, Lending of Last Resort and Sys-
temic Stability in the Eurozone, SUERF Studies 41 (2000).   
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tutional differences serve as barriers to further financial inte-
gration and may very well prove to be an impeding factor to-
ward a smooth transition to the EU’s single monetary policy.59  
In the field of financial regulation, the principle of minimum 
harmonization and mutual recognition, which originally was 
thought to be able to naturally induce a convergence of regula-
tory behavior and more uniform rules over time, did not work.  
Moreover, there is a concrete risk that competition in this area 
will not even generate the more efficient outcome.  On one side, 
an incentive exists to promote less demanding domestic finan-
cial regulations and supervision in order to let each country be-
come more attractive on their own for running financial busi-
ness.60  On the other side, it is not clear who will pay the costs of 
potential insolvency following excessive risk taking behavior 
and financial misconduct in a member country.61  Finally, with 
increasing international banking activities and a European 
real-time gross settlement system in place (e.g., the Trans-
European Automated Real-time Gross Settlement Transfer Sys-
tem (“TARGET”)),62 the argument that domestic regulators and 
supervisors have better knowledge and can exercise more effi-
cient control is becoming less persuasive.63 
Another important point is that no clear tool of responsibility 
for countering and/or managing the risk of financial instability 
and crisis has been established in Europe.64  The EC Treaty is 
silent on this topic.65  It is not even evident that the ECB will 
perform the role of lender of last resort, 66 which would be desir-
able because the ECB functionally acts as a central bank.  In 
fact, only in the case of a wide-spread liquidity crisis affecting 
the whole euro area, would the ECB likely assume such a role.67  
  
 59. VIVES, supra note 8, at 19. 
 60. Id. at 5. 
 61. See infra notes 75–77.   
 62. TARGET is the payment system of the ESCB.  See V IVES, supra note 8, 
at 9.   
 63. See Prati & Schinasi, supra note 55, at 44.   
 64. See Bruni & de Boissieu, supra note 58, at 41, 43, 45.  
 65. See TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY , Nov. 10, 1997, 
O.J. (C 340) 3 (1997) art. 105; Di Noia & Di Giorio, supra note 40, at 363 n.4; 
VIVES, supra note 8, at 9, 21. 
 66. See Bruni & de Boissieu, supra note 58, at 41. 
 67. See V IVES supra note 8, at 18 (discussing the ECBs possible involve-
ment). 
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But it is unclear what would follow a liquidity crisis located in a 
single member country,  or a general solvency crisis.68  
For these reasons, the EMU needs a higher degree of coordi-
nation in the field of financial regulation and prudential super-
vision.  Both regulation and supervision require further har-
monization as financial market integration evolves.69  Such 
harmonization attempts are currently observable among merg-
ers and acquisitions of stock exchanges.70  Moreover, Internet 
development fosters distribution channels for financial services 
that will render the physical location of the financial firms ir-
relevant, and will pose additional regulatory problems.  In addi-
tion, there continues to be a trend towards increasing cross-
border mergers among intermediaries, groups, and conglomer-
ates, as well as the dual and cross-border offerings and listings 
of securities.71  However, harmonization does not necessarily 
mean complete centralization.  If it is too late to continue  with 
different national regulators and supervisors, it is probably too 
early for having one or more central regulator(s) and supervi-
sor(s) for the entire euro area.  Indeed, not only is the euro area 
too large, but too many different rules still exist72 and fiscal 
  
 68. Suppose we face a situation in which a single financial institution lo-
cated in a member country is in trouble.  What kind of intervention, if any, is 
currently allowed?  One of the typical forms of public intervention seems lost, 
and probably the most natural, that of central bank last resort loans.  See  
GOODHART ET AL., supra note 17, at 353; Xavier Freixas et al., Lender of Last 
Resort: A Review of the Literature, 7 FIN. STABILITY REV. 151, 154–57 (1999), 
available at, http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/fsr/fsr07art6.pdf.  The ECB will 
not intervene in favor of a single institution, especially if its financial links are 
mostly domestic, because it could always assign some of the responsibility for 
the crisis to the domestic financial regulator-supervisor.  The domestic central 
bank can not intervene by providing funds without an explicit authorization 
by the ECB.  In this case, it will have to convince the latter that the institu-
tion is facing a liquidity and not a solvency crisis, according to the old Bage-
hot’s doctrine, and/or that the risk of potential spread and contagion of the 
crisis is high.  This requires time and resources.  The other two traditional 
instruments, bail out through a safety net provided by the banking system or 
through the government budget will ultimately shift the burden on the shoul-
ders of domestic taxpayers. 
 69. Padoa-Schioppa, supra note 3, at 300.  See Dale, supra note 20.  But cf. 
WHITE, TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE, supra note 55, at 28.   
 70. See Cybo-Ottone et al., supra note 51, at 239.   
 71. Id. at 238.   
 72. For example, rules for commercial codes, company laws, failure proce-
dures, corporate governance, etc. 
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policies have yet to be harmonized.  In addition, national en-
forcement might still be desirable in most cases.  Thus, the only 
feasible solution is the federal approach to financial regulation 
and supervision, which could be organized with a structure 
similar to the one established for monetary policy with the 
ESCB.  The next section examines the regulatory model best 
suited for the entire euro area, and suggests two feasible insti-
tutional architectures to implement such a plan.   
III. REGULATION “BY OBJECTIVE” IN THE EURO AREA 
The selection of a feasible regulatory model for the entire 
euro area presents formidable challenges.  To begin, the old “in-
stitutional” model could be considered a good candidate, but 
only in a context with rigidly separated financial segments, and 
where no global players are at stake.  But this scenario does not 
apply to the euro area where a high degree of integration in fi-
nancial markets and intermediaries as well as multifunctional 
groups and conglomerates are rapidly growing.73  Discounting 
the institutional model, the choice is narrowed down to one of 
the transversal models — the “by objective”74 approach and the 
Single Regulator Model75   
  
 73. See generally LANNOO, supra note 8.   
 74. LLEWELLYN, supra note 24, at 8, 9.   
 75. A third “transversal” model is the termed “functional supervision,” or 
supervision “by activity.”  Although never fully applied in practice, this ap-
proach assumes the economic functions performed in the financial system, but 
does not postulate that existing institutions must necessarily continue to exist 
as such, in terms of both their structure and role.  The financial system is 
considered to perform some basic functions, including: provision of clearing 
and settlement services; resource pooling; portfolio diversification; provision-
ing of ways of transferring economic resources through time, across borders, 
and among industries; risk management services; price information discovery; 
and reduction of informational asymmetries.  These “functions” or activities, 
undertaken by financial markets and intermediaries, are considered to be 
more stable than the institutions currently performing them.  Robert Merton 
& Zvi Bodie, A Conceptual Framework for Analyzing the Financial Environ-
ment, in THE  GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM: A FUNCTIONAL PERSPECTIVE 3, 12–16 
(Dwight B. Crane et al. eds., 1995).  
In the “functional supervisory” model, each of these activities should be regu-
lated by a given authority independently of the operator who offers it.  Hence, 
also this approach has the important advantage that it calls for the same 
rules to be applied to intermediaries who perform the same activities.  More-
over, it fosters economies of specialization within the supervisory authorities 
and might represent a rather attractive solution for the regulation of inte-
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The single regulator solution aims at reaching a more effi-
cient organization of supervisory activities, including a reduc-
tion in the costs of regulating itself.76  The advantages of this 
approach lie in the economies of scale that it produces — fixed 
costs, logistical expenses, the administrative personnel costs, 
and executive management compensation costs are all consid-
erably reduced.77  Moreover, this regulatory scheme calls for a 
unified view which is particularly useful and effective with re-
spect to multifunctional groups and conglomerates.  By the 
same token, the costs of supervision charged to those regulated 
and/or to taxpayers decrease, and there is less room for “regula-
tory arbitrage.”78  In addition, it is considered useful to have 
just one agency accountable to the market and to legislative 
oversight.79  However, the validity of this model strongly de-
pends on its internal organization: if the numerous areas of 
competence and specialization are not well-structured and coor-
dinated, the decision-making process risks slowing down.  
James Q. Wilson in his seminal work on bureaucracy noted that 
what counts is a clear definition of an agency’s “mission.”80  
Moreover, the presence of a sole regulator might foment and 
accelerate collusive relations between the regulator and the 
regulated (i.e., “regulatory capture.”)81  Finally, this model 
might exacerbate problems of self-contradiction in the event 
that the authority should find itself forced to pursue conflicting 
supervisory objectives.82  However, an internal organization di-
vided “by objectives” might partially surmount this problem, 
  
grated, advanced financial markets.  However, it has numerous drawbacks.  
In particular, this model envisions an overlapping of bodies controlling the 
same subject: there is the risk of an excessive division of powers and responsi-
bilities among the regulatory agencies.  A further disadvantage of the func-
tional approach is that finally what is subject to failure is not the activity 
performed, but the institution.  In case of serious problems of stability, it 
would be essential to guarantee protection and oversight with regard to the 
institutions rather than to individual operations.   
 76. See BRIAULT, supra note 29, at 18–23. 
 77. Id. at 18–20.   
 78. Id. at 19.   
 79. See id. at 18.   
 80. See JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY 101, 109-110 (1989).  See also 
ABRAMS & TAYLOR, supra note 48, at 6.   
 81. See WILSON, supra note 80, at 83–84; ABRAMS & TAYLOR, supra note 48, 
at 16.   
 82. See ABRAMS & TAYLOR, supra note 48, at 17. 
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although the fact that executive management is one of the sub-
ject-matter objectives may lead to the creation of a prevalent 
“single objective” as far as the decision-making process is con-
cerned.83 
The possible conflict of interest, or trade-off, in pursuing dif-
ferent objectives is of particular interest when they are assigned 
to the same agency.84  Under this type of regime, the Single 
Regulator Model is affected by the possible incompatibility 
among different supervisory objectives.85  In the credit sector, 
for instance, there exists a clear trade-off between competition 
and stability, at least in the short run.  The need to safeguard 
stability in moments of economic and financial tension led to 
the use of instruments designed to limit competition, such as 
institutional barriers to market entry, or to the introduction of 
legal limits to certain activities.86  In countries where banks are 
still dominant national players in the financial sector, but not 
efficient enough to compete cross-border (e.g., Spain, Italy, 
Germany), the objective of competition is more easily sacrificed 
than stability.87  The consequence is a “stable” environment in 
terms of the number and identity of intermediaries.  But this 
stability may also be obtained by altering the free play of com-
petition with measures that prevent exit of inefficient actors 
from the market. 
Potential conflict may also develop between the objectives of 
stability and transparency (investor protection).  Again, with 
regard to the banking sector, scarce transparency in fund gath-
ering activities, for example in the issuance of securities, might 
allow the application of interest rates at below-market rates.  
Such behavior could be considered functional to the strengthen-
ing of banking’s stability, but it would inevitably result in direct 
injury to investors.  The most immediate response to this im-
portant problem might be to attribute to different authorities 
seperate supervision objectives by adopting the regulatory 
model “by objectives” as the benchmark for advanced financial 
systems.   
  
 83. See id. 
 84. See id. 
 85. See id. 
 86. Id.   
 87. See Padoa-Schioppa, supra note 3, at 298.   
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The supervisory model “by objectives,” or by finalities, postu-
lates that all intermediaries and markets be subject to the con-
trol of more than one authority — each single authority then 
remains responsible for each regulation objective regardless of 
the legal form and functions, or activities that the intermediar-
ies perform.88  According to this scheme, the first authority 
watches over prudential regulation and micro-stability of both 
markets and all intermediaries, regardless of whether in bank-
ing, finance, or insurance.  Such an agency should supervise the 
stability of the entire financial market and of individual finan-
cial intermediaries by licensing authorizations, controlling pro-
fessional registers, performing inspections, issuing sanctions, 
and managing crises.  Authorities operating under this model 
should cooperate with the second authority — the Central Bank 
— which is responsible for monetary policy and macro-stability, 
including supervising security settlement and payment sys-
tems, clearing houses, and in monitoring the use of financial 
instruments in wholesale markets.   
The third authority under this model is responsible for trans-
parency and investor protection.  It should supervise disclosure 
requirements, the behavior of intermediaries, and the orderly 
conduct of trading in all financial intermediation activities that 
banking, securities, and life insurance intermediaries perform.89  
Moreover, such an authority should be assigned powers of regu-
lating misleading advertising by financial intermediaries.  Fi-
nally, it should also control macro-transparency in financial 
markets, including the discipline of insider trading, takeovers, 
and public offers.   
A fourth authority should guarantee fair competition, and 
should guard against abuses of dominant positions and limit 
dangerous concentrations in banking, security, and insurance 
sectors.  A diagram of this “four -peak” model for financial regu-
lation is provided in Figure 1.   
Australia recently chose this form of solution, and it appears 
particularly effective in a highly-integrated market context, as 
well as in the presence of multifunctional operators, conglomer-
ates, and groups operating in a variety of different business sec-
  
 88. See GOODHART ET AL., supra note 17, at 156–57.  See also OECD 2002, 
supra note 8, at 99-101. 
 89. Including discipline and control in the area of transparency in con-
tracts.   
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tors.  The “four-peak” model’s most attractive feature is that it 
provides uniform regulation for different entities engaged in 
similar activities.  At the same time, this model does not require 
excessive proliferation of control units. 
Australia’s Financial Sector Reform Act of 1999 harmonized 
financial rules and supervision assignments at the Common-
wealth level.90  The Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission (“ASIC”) protects investors, superannuates, deposi-
tors, and insurance policy holders.91  This agency regulates and 
enforces laws that promote fairness and proper behavior within 
the financial markets and exchanges as well as among financial 
firms and advisors.92  The ASIC cooperates with three other 
primary regulatory bodies at the Commonwealth level.  For ex-
ample, the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority 
(“APRA”), established in 1998, is responsible for ensuring that 
financial institutions will honor their commitments.93  The 
APRA currently safeguards the soundness of deposit-taking 
institutions, insurance companies, and other financial firms 
after having inherited the powers and duties previously held by 
the Australian Central Bank and the Insurance and Superan-
nuation Commission.94  Monetary policy and systemic stability 
are assigned to the Reserve Bank of Australia, which is the 
third institutional member represented in the Council of Finan-
cial Regulators, the official site that fosters coordination efforts 
and resolves conflicts.95  Finally, the fourth agency, the Austra-
lian Competition and Consumer Commission, is charged with 
antitrust powers and responsibilities.96   
It is too early to evaluate the success of Australia’s recent re-
forms.  ASIC’s 1999–2000 Annual Report indicates noticeable 
improvements in the speed of completing both corporate and 
  
 90. Financial Sector Reform Act, 1999 (Austl.) (repealed).   
 91. For more information on the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission (“ASIC”), see website at www.asic.gov.au/asic/asic.nsf (last vis-
ited Mar. 1, 2003).   
 92. Id. 
 93. See also APRA Online Action Plan, supra note 23. 
 94. Id.   
 95. See generally Reserve Bank of Australia, at www.rba.gov.au/AboutThe 
RBA.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2003). 
 96. See generally Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 
(“ACCC”), at www.accc.gov.au/about.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2003).   
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market investigations and in the registration of prospectuses.97  
In addition, stemming from Australia’s financial reform, the 
largest number ever of unqualified people were banned from 
giving investment advice, and 84% of the 461 court cases chal-
lenging the ban were upheld.98  Results from an ASIC bench-
marking survey also indicate improved public perception of the 
effectiveness in regulating financial reporting, corporate disclo-
sure, market integrity and law enforcement.99   
In 2001, however, HIH Insurance Ltd. (“HIH”), the second 
largest insurance company in Australia, collapsed.100  Mounting 
criticisms of this insolvency brought the new prudential author-
ity, APRA, under pressure.101  Nevertheless, many of the prob-
lems leading to HIH’s failure had originated during the previ-
ous regulatory scheme.  In fact, the APRA publicly recognized 
the weakness in the previous insurance sector regulation, under 
the Insurance Act of 1973, and launched a thorough reform, 
which will be implemented in the near future.102  Regardless, 
the Australian Government criticized APRA for its untimely 
intervention and appointed a Royal Commission to examine 
case and assess responsibility.103   
Compared to the “institutional” or the Single Regulator 
Model, a regulatory framework organized “by objectives” obvi-
  
 97. See generally ASIC ANN. REP., supra note 22.   
 98. Id.  
 99. Id.  
 100. Charles E. Boyle, Australian Insurer HIH Seeks Bankruptcy Protection 
as Losses Mount, INS. J., Apr. 9, 2001, at www.insurancejournal.com/ 
magazines/west/2001/04/09/features/17957.htm; David Kehl, E-Brief: HIH 
Insurance Group Collapse, Parliament of Australia, Department of the Par-
liamentary Library, at http://www.aph.gov.au/library/INTGUIDE/econ/hih_ 
insurance.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2003).   
 101. Paul Cleary, APRA’s shortcomings spelt out, AUSTL. FIN. REV., Sept. 6, 
2001, at 6.   
 102. Id.  See also Insurance Act, 1973 (Austl.), available at  
http://scaleplus.law.gov.au (last visited Mar. 2, 2003); Press Release, No. 02-
56, APRA: Both the regulator and the industry have learnt from HIH (Nov. 
29, 2002), available at.http://www.apra.gov.au/internetapps/Print_Media_ 
Page. 
 103. Press Conference, Transcript of the Prime Minister, The Hon. John 
Howard, MP Joint Press Conference with Minister Joe Hockey (Parliament 
House, Canberra, May 21, 2001), available at www.pm.gov.au/news/ 
interviews/2001/interview1060.htm; HIH Royal Commision, Proposed Terms 
of Reference, June 18, 2001, available at www.pm.gov.au/news/media_ 
releases/2001/media_release1100.htm. 
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ously produces a certain degree of multiple controls.104  Such 
regulations may also lead to a lack of other controls, since spe-
cific assignment of responsibilities with respect to the objectives 
of regulation are not necessarily univocal and all-inclusive in 
practice.105  Since each intermediary is subject to the control of 
more than one authority, this regulatory model might also 
prove more costly.106  For example, the intermediaries might in 
fact be required to produce several reports relating to their su-
pervision, which may often contain identical or similar informa-
tion.  The intermediaries may also have to justify the same ac-
tion to a whole set of authorities contemporaneously, though 
each for different reasons.  Vice versa, a deficit of controls might 
occur whenever the exact areas of responsibilities are not 
clearly identifiable.  Finally, in order to be effective and to avoid 
the conflicts of interest, a regulatory model organized “by objec-
tives” needs a coordination committee consisting of all the dif-
ferent authorities as well as the central bank.107 
In practice, however, the difference between the Single Regu-
lator Model and the one “by objectives” is not as relevant.  Ac-
tually, since it is often the case that antitrust responsibilities in 
the financial sector are assigned to a dedicated agency, and 
since the central bank remains in charge of macroeconomic sta-
bility, the Single Regulator Model acts as a “three-peak” regula-
tory model “by objective,” in which the two objectives of micro-
economic stability — prudential supervision and investor pro-
tection — are assigned to a unique agency.108  In this light, the 
choice between one of the two alternatives has to be made 
pragmatically — by comparing the likely costs deriving from 
conflicts of interest among agencies simultaneously pursuing 
the targets of microeconomic stability and investor protection, 
  
 104. See Consolidated Supervision in Theory & Practice, Directorate for 
Financial, Fiscal, & Enterprise Affairs, Committee on Financial Markets 4 
(Mar. 7, 2001) [hereinafter Consolidated Supervision]; GOODHART ET AL., supra 
note 17, at 156–57; LLEWELLYN , supra note 24, at 49.   
 105. See BRIAULT, supra note 29, at 11.   
 106. See, e.g., id. at 6. 
 107. See, e.g., LANNOO, supra note 8, at 34.   
 108. See Consolidated Supervision supra note 104, at 8.   
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with those costs of establishing one additional agency and its 
attendant bureaucracy.109   
A. Financial Regulatory Proposal for the Euro Area 
This Article advocates that a modification of the current regu-
latory structure in the euro area’s financial sector would solve 
some problematic issues regarding financial stability and ad-
dress the need for greater coordinated transparency and inves-
tor protection rules.  Of course, structuring and creating such 
an integrated system of rules and institutions in the EU is far 
from easy; such a change will require time, resources, political 
support, and widespread collaborative attitude.  Nevertheless, 
it is hoped that this Article will at least constructively contrib-
ute to the current discussion.   
As already stressed, whether financial regulation in the euro 
area should be fully centralized at the European level, or im-
proved through more adept harmonization at the regional level 
is a difficult question to answer.  Many arguments support the 
view of centralizing and unifying financial regulation in the 
euro area.110  However, the feasibility and opportunity of a 
European centralized solution is diminished by the observation 
that the euro area might be too large to be controlled by one or 
two central agencies.  Many different rules are still in place 
with respect to commercial codes, company laws, corporate gov-
ernance schemes, failure procedures and so on.  EU directives, 
when they actually exist, do only establish a common floor.  Dif-
ferent fiscal policies are still in place even with a single cur-
rency and a common monetary policy.  Furthermore, the EU’s 
taxation of both financial services and other items still lacks 
homogeneity.  In any case, some form of national enforcement is 
probably still needed.   
Hence, the EU should establish a European System of Finan-
cial Regulators (“ESFR”), structured similarly to the ESCB and 
  
 109. See generally Christian Hawkesby, The Institutional Structure of Fi-
nancial Supervision: A Cost-Benefit Approach, 2 J. INT’L BANKING REG. 36 
(2000).   
 110. See, e.g., WHITE , TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE , supra note 55.  In particular, 
an integrated supervision on markets and intermediaries would be valuable in 
a scenario dominated by conglomerates and characterized by the expansion of 
electronic communication networks, market manipulation and trades on the 
net.   
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organized according to the “by objective” model of regulation, 
which includes the single regulator solution as a particular 
case.  A European Central Authority (“ECA”), separated from 
the ECB, should be at the system’s center for each objective of 
regulation.  In a first stage (lasting for, perhaps, three years), 
these authorities would be able to harmonize and coordinate 
financial regulation in member countries, design common prin-
ciples and guidelines for prudential supervision, and set out 
appropriate disclosure instruments and requirements.  The EU 
members should sponsor the institutional changes at the do-
mestic level necessary for these institutions to merge and reor-
ganize the supervisory and regulatory powers within the finan-
cial sector of each member country.  At the end of this process, 
each country should have only one national agency responsible 
for each objective of financial market regulation.  Each national 
agency will then participate according to the area’s general 
strategies and principles of financial regulation, becoming a 
member of the ESFR.  These agencies will then implement the 
rules and the supervisory duties agreed upon at the euro level 
within their respective country.   
The “four-peak” reform model calls for the establishment of 
two new European agencies — one responsible for microeco-
nomic stability (“European Financial  Supervision Authority”) 
and the other responsible for oversight of financial intermediar-
ies regarding transparency in the market, investor protection, 
and disclosure requirements (“European Authority for Market 
Transparency”).  These two central agencies should then coor-
dinate among the different domestic agencies in each member 
country.  Apart from this vertical form of coordination, coopera-
tion should be engaged horizontally, at both the EU and na-
tional levels.  The coordination and resolution of eventual con-
troversies could be provided by special commissions for the su-
pervision of the financial system established at the European 
Commission and national treasuries.111  These commissions 
would serve as the breeding ground for proposals and consulta-
tions concerning financial market regulation.   
Under this regulatory proposal, no member of the ESFR 
should have antitrust power so as to avoid the trade-off between 
  
 111. E. GERALD CORRIGAN, FINANCIAL MARKET STRUCTURE : A LONGER V IEW, 
ANNUAL REPORT FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK (1987).   
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competition, and stability, and transparency.  Moreover, since 
agencies responsible for supervising market competition cur-
rently exist at both European and national levels, it would be 
wise to establish an additional independent central agency — 
the EU Antitrust General Direction.  This agency would then 
coordinate and promote domestic antitrust agencies.  In each 
member state, the national antitrust agency would be able to 
safeguard competition in all economic sectors.  The proposed 
“four-peak” model for financial regulation in the EU is sche-
matically presented in Figure 2.   
Admittedly, this Article’s proposed regulatory structure is in-
deed ambitious, requiring a substantial amount of coordination 
among the different authorities.  An additional and delicate 
challenge is that of the accountability of these new and existing 
independent agencies, a topic that while deserving of separate 
investigation, lies beyond the scope of this Article.  Another im-
portant obstacle would be the institutional and political resis-
tance by current national agencies, who would not passively 
accept the abolishment or weakening of their regulatory pow-
ers.  For such reasons, the alternative solution of merging fi-
nancial supervision authority and market transparency agen-
cies into a single regulator may provide a practical solution.  A 
single regulator under this model would diminish the costs of 
bureaucracy and regulation, and make coordination efforts eas-
ier.112  At the same time, possible conflicts of interest in pursu-
ing investor protection and microeconomic stability, although 
present, are certainly less relevant than the conflicts of interest 
between stability and efficiency.113  In a “three-peak” model, the 
single European Central Authority for financial market regula-
tion would cooperate with the ECB for the purpose of macroeco-
nomic stability.114  The ECA would also organize and coordinate 
the work of various domestic agencies, which in different coun-
tries could be either specialized “by objective”115 or could be re-
  
 112. See generally Julian R. Franks et al., The Direct Compliance Costs of 
Financial Regulation, 21 J. BANKING & FIN. 1547 (1997).   
 113. See id. at 1563–64.   
 114. See OECD 2001, supra note 8, at 5; OECD 2002, supra note 8, at 16, ¶ 
50. 
 115. See OECD 2002, supra note 8, at 15, ¶ 46, fig. 6. 
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sponsible for both market transparency and stability as the Fi-
nancial Services Authority is in the U.K.116 
In fact, a good example of international cooperation and coor-
dination efforts can presently be found within banking supervi-
sion of the Basle Committee, which works on a wide range of 
topics, employing no formal by-laws, but which maintains a 
very strong leadership.117  Furthermore, many institutional ar-
rangements for the regulation and supervision of the financial 
sector at the EU level already exist.  The most important are 
the Banking Advisory Committee and the Insurance Commit-
tee,118 both possessing comitological powers.119 
In contrast, securities supervision did not succeed in estab-
lishing a similar long record of international rule-making or an 
EU securities committee capable of comitological powers.120  The 
European supervisory system would gain both in consistency 
and effectiveness if all stability-oriented rules, all transparency-
oriented rules, and all competition-oriented rules, for all types 
of financial institutions and markets were either issued or bet-
ter coordinated by distinct independent agencies at the euro 
level.  Only recently the Financial Services Action Plan mapped 
out a first set of improvements to the EU legislative framework 
for securities markets.121  Meanwhile the Committee of Wise 
Men on the Regulation of European Securities Markets released 
a final report indicating a four-step approach to making im-
  
 116. See Financial Services Authority, at http://www.fsa.gov.uk (last visited 
Feb. 24, 2003).   
 117. See, e.g., INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS, supra note 8, at 17–20.   
 118. Id. at 6–7, 23.  
 119. Comitology refers to the delegation of implementing powers by the 
Council to the Commission for the execution of EU legislation — representa-
tives of member states, acting through committees called “Comitology Com-
mittees,” assist the Commission’s execution of its conferred implementing 
powers.  See LAMFALUSSY REPORT, supra note 8, at 24. 
 120. See generally White, International Regulation, supra note 34, at 207; 
John C. Coffee, Jr., Competition Versus Consolidation: The Significance of 
Organizational Structure in Financial and Securities Regulation, 50 BUS. 
LAW. 447 (1994).  See also, e.g., KAREL LANNOO, EU SECURITIES MARKET 
REGULATION: ADAPTING TO THE NEEDS OF A SINGLE CAPITAL MARKET — REPORT 
OF A CEPS TASK FORCE 34–35 (2001).   
 121. Financial Services: Implementing the Framework for Financial Mar-
kets: Action Plan, COM(1999)232 final (Nov. 1999).   
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provements in the EU regulation of securities markets that was 
approved by the European Parliament in February 2002.122   
IV. CONCLUSION 
This Article argues that financial market regulation should 
be redesigned and harmonized in the euro area according to a 
regulatory model “by objectives” or “finalities.”  This calls for 
assigning all supervisory powers and regulatory responsibilities 
in financial markets and intermediaries to a limited number of 
distinct and independent agencies, regardless of their titles as 
insurance companies, banks, or investment firms.  These agen-
cies should be in charge, respectively, of microeconomic stabil-
ity, investor protection, and competition safeguards in the fi-
nancial sector.  They should cooperate with the central bank for 
the purpose of guaranteeing macroeconomic stability and finan-
cial soundness.   
Two new European financial regulation agencies should be 
established in the euro area, each formally separated by the 
ECB.  These agencies should be responsible for the comprehen-
sive coordination of both legislation and execution of regulation 
in financial markets: the first ECA should be responsible for the 
microeconomic stability of all intermediaries; the second for 
transparency and disclosure requirements; guaranteeing com-
petition in financial and non-financial markets is already safe-
guarded by having the Antitrust General Direction of the Euro-
pean Commission, as well as the national agencies.  It would be 
wise to transform the “EU Antitrust General Direction” into a 
central and independent European agency.  The latter and the 
two newly created central agencies would be at the center of 
three European Systems of Financial Regulators, each one 
structured similarly and working in connection to the ESCB 
  
 122. LAMFALUSSY REPORT, supra note 8 (Adopting a broad framework prin-
ciples: implementation of these principles through a new EU Securities Com-
mittee; implementation of Community law by Member States within the 
framework of strengthened cooperation and networking between national 
regulators; establishing a European Committee of Securities Regulators; and 
urging stronger work by the EU Commission to ensure open and fair competi-
tion in the European financial markets.)  See also Financial Markets: Com-
mission Welcomes Parliament’s Agreement on Lamfalussy Proposals for Re-
form, Feb. 5, 2002, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/ 
finances/general/02-195.htm.   
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thereby requiring active participation of national agencies in 
member countries.  This setup is essential for maintenance of 
regulation and supervision at both the European and national 
levels in this proposed federal regulatory system.  If this “four-
peak” regulatory model “by objective” leads to an excess of bu-
reaucracy and poses serious coordination problems in the euro 
area, as well as in each member country, a more practical solu-
tion would call for merging the authorities responsible for mi-
croeconomic stability and for investor protection into a single 
agency, following the U.K.’s FSA example.  The conflict of inter-
est ensuing in these two objectives is surely less significant 
than that between stability and efficiency. 
Many difficulties are obvious in this proposal.  Even in case of 
a consensus on the final architecture for financial market regu-
lation, it is difficult to design and follow a feasible political and 
institutional plan to build it.  Changes in the Maastricht Treaty 
are needed in order to establish new agencies.123  These can be 
proposed only at the next intergovernmental conference and not 
before 2004.  Changes in the national legislation of each EU 
member country are also needed, and providing a satisfactory 
degree of accountability for the new agencies will be a difficult 
task.  Moreover, there most likely will be strong political and 
institutional opposition to such reforms.  To be sure, full finan-
cial market integration will require a much higher degree of 
political integration in Europe.   
The authors maintain that there is an observable movement 
towards a financial regulatory scheme similar to the proposed 
“four-peak” architecture.  With regards to macrostability and 
competition, there is already an incomplete federal system in 
place.  For investor protection and business conduct, the new 
committees established in the wake of the Lamfalussy Report 
have started to coordinate and guide the national securities 
regulators.124  The present challenge deals with prudential su-
pervision and microstability of all financial intermediaries.  
Given the consolidated experience of the Basle Committee on 
Banking Supervision and the recent experiment of the ESCB 
and the forum of European Securities Commissions (“CESR”), it 
  
 123. MAASTRICHT TREATY : TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. (C 
191) 1 (1992), 31 I.L.M. 253. 
 124. See generally LAMFALUSSY REPORT, supra note 9.  See also European 
Securities Regulation: Trojan Horses, ECONOMIST, Feb. 15, 2003, at 67–80. 
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seems plausible to believe that a new framework for European 
financial market regulation and supervision will emerge based 
on EU-level harmonized (secondary) regulation as well as na-
tional supervision.   
 
 
File: DI GIORGIO Base  Macro.doc Created on:  3/19/2003 3:33 PM Last Printed: 4/28/2003 11:29 AM 
492 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 28:2 
TABLES AND GRAPHS 
Figure 1: Current Assignment of Responsibilities for Supervi-
sion in Banking, Securities, and Insurance Markets in the EU† 
 
Country Banking Securities Insurance 
Austria U U U 
Belgium BS BS I 
Denmark U U U 
Finland BS BS I 
France* CB,B B,S I 
Germany U U U 
Greece CB S G 
Ireland CB,U CB,U CB,U 
Italy CB** CB, S I 
Luxembourg BS BS I 
Netherlands CB,S CB,S I,S 
Portugal CB S I 
Spain CB S G 
Sweden U U U 
United  
Kingdom 
U U U 
 
Key to Figure 1:    
CB: Central Bank 
BS: Banking and Securities Supervisor 
B: Banking Supervisor 
S: Securities Supervisor 
I: Insurance Supervisor 
G: Government Department 
U: Single Financial Supervisor 
 
 
  
 † Sources: ECB, MONTHLY BULLETIN (Apr. 2000), available at  
http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/mb200004en.pdf; KAREL LANNOO, CENTRE FOR 
EUROPEAN POLICY STUDIES, CHALLENGES TO THE STRUCTURAL SUPERVISION IN 
THE EU 34 (2000). 
 * Project announced to introduce a single financial supervisor. 
 ** In Italy the Central bank is also the authority responsible for antitrust 
in the banking sector. 
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Figure 2: A Four-peak Regulatory Model by “Objectives” for 
the Financial Sector 
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Figure 3: The European System of Financial Regulation 
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